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Abstract
Some retail markets are more competitive than others. A manufacturer with
market power in the wholesale market who sells his product to competing retailers
in cities and monopolistic ones in each of various towns must set the wholesale price
diﬀerence between towns and cities to be smaller than the transportation cost to
prevent “grey market” arbitrage. If he uses linear pricing, the town retail price will
be even higher than under single-retailer double marginalization. Two-part tariﬀs
do not solve the problem as they would if there were a single retailer, because the
wholesale unit price must be higher than marginal cost to prevent arbitrage to the
cities. If transportation costs are low, price discrimination is diﬃcult and two- part
tariﬀs come to resemble ineﬃcient linear monopoly pricing. High transportation costs
allow greater eﬃciency in contracting, and this can outweigh the negative direct eﬀect
on welfare.
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11 Introduction
Double marginalization and price discrimination are two of industrial organization’s key
ideas. The problem of double marginalization is that if the manufacturer has market power
and charges higher than marginal cost to the retailer, and the retailer has market power and
marks the retail price to the consumer up to above his own marginal cost, then industry
proﬁts and total welfare both will be lower than under vertical integration. The problem of
price discrimination is that a manufacturer selling to two retailers with diﬀerent demands
would like to charge diﬀerent prices to them. In this paper, we see what happens when
the two problems are combined: a manufacturer wants to use two pricing schemes, one for
competing retailers (in large “cities”) and one for retailers with market power (in small
“towns” that are natural monopolies).
For price discrimination to occur, resale must not be costless, so we will assume positive
transportation costs whenever there is a resale. We will look at both linear pricing– a
constant price per unit– and two-part tariﬀs– a constant per-unit price plus a ﬁxed access
fee. We will specify a transaction cost for using a two-part tariﬀ, but we will also let this
cost be zero, and it will not drive our most interesting results.
We establish two main results. First, in a retail network, with linear pricing the ﬁnal
prices can be even higher than under single-retailer double marginalization. Second, even
when two-part tariﬀs are used, the wholesale price can be above marginal cost, and thus
double marginalization cannot be totally eliminated. These two results imply that in a retail
network we might expect more complex vertical restraints than when the manufacturer sells
to only one retailer.
In the model, a monopolist manufacturer supplies its product to multiple retailers who
sell in both small towns and large cities. We can imagine that a retailer is a grocery chain.
Each retailer is a monopolist in one or more towns, which are natural monopolies, but in
cities intense price competition drives prices to marginal cost. Since retailers are competitive
in cities, the manufacturer earns the monopoly proﬁt by setting wholesale prices there equal
to the monopoly price. On the other hand, since retailers are monopolists in towns, there
will be double marginalization if the town wholesale price is above the marginal cost. If the
manufacturer chooses linear pricing contracts for both towns and cities, it suﬀers double
marginalization in towns. Two-part tariﬀs can help the problem in the towns, but they are
unnecessary and impractical for the cities, where retailers have no market power and their
zero proﬁts would not permit them to pay a two-part tariﬀ’s lump-sum fee.
The manufacturer may want to sign diﬀerent contracts with the retailers – one for
towns and one for cities, but there is a problem with this arrangement. A retailer may
arbitrage its inventories from its stores in towns to its stores in cities, or vice versa. We will
assume that retailers must pay a transportation cost if they arbitrage, and we will show
that the manufacturer will then set the wholesale price diﬀerence between towns and cities
smaller than the transportation cost, preventing arbitrage. Subject to this constraint, if
transportation costs are “small ”, with linear pricing the retail price will be even higher
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will be above marginal cost. As a result, double marginalization cannot be totally eliminated
by two-part tariﬀ pricing.
Other nonlinear contracts besides two-part tariﬀs could solve the problem, but they
must exert more direct control on the retailers, controlling either the quantities they buy
or the prices they charge. We will discuss these alternatives once we have shown formally
how a two-part tariﬀ will fail to work.
The Literature
Spengler (1950) set out the classic problem of double marginalization. If an upstream
manufacturer with monopoly power sells to a downstream retailer who has monopoly power
in the consumer market, and they choose prices independently, the consumer price will be
higher than the monopoly price. As a result, both consumer and producer surplus fall
relative to the “single marginalization ” one-stage monopoly. Cook (1955) and Hirshleifer
(1956) show that ﬁrms can overcome the problem if the manufacturer uses a two-part tariﬀ,
charging marginal cost to the retailer plus a ﬁxed fee.
Since marginal costs are usually not observable, putting the theory into practice can be
diﬃcult. One stream of discussion in the literature has focused on the choice of transfer
prices within multi-divisional ﬁrms (for example, Menge (1961), Vaysman (1998), Baldenius,
Reichelstein and Sahay (1999), and Baldenius and Reichelstein (2006)). Another stream of
the literature (e.g., Mathewson and Winter (1983a,b, 1984), Rey and Tirole (1986, 2003),
Tirole (1988) and Rey (2003)) studies double marginalization in the context of vertical re-
straints generally. If vertical externalities are present, upstream manufacturers often impose
additional restraints in contracts to ensure that right actions are taken by their downstream
retailers. An example is the vertical externality generated by double marginalization. By
using a franchise fee or a two-part tariﬀ, vertical ﬁrms can coordinate their pricing decisions.
Not only can they maximize the industry joint proﬁt, but consumers are better oﬀ. In this
sense vertical restraints are eﬃciency-enhancing.
It is well known that the two-part tariﬀ is a suﬃcient instrument if there is only simple
double marginalization, with no uncertainty or private information. We often, however,
observe more complicated and hard-to-administer contracts involving resale price mainte-
nance, exclusive territories, exclusive dealing, quantity forcing, revenue sharing and all-units
discounts. Why? Perhaps for anti-competitive purposes. For example, Salop and Scheﬀman
(1983) show that a dominant ﬁrm can raise its rivals’ costs and earn a proﬁt if, in doing so,
the dominant ﬁrm’s residual demand increases more than its own average cost. Rasmusen,
Ramseyer and Wiley (1991) show that by signing exclusion contracts with suﬃciently large
number of customers a less eﬃcient ﬁrm can deter the entries of even more eﬃcient potential
competitors. Rey and Stiglitz (1988, 1994) show how monopolistic manufacturers can use
vertical restraints such as exclusive territories to increase proﬁts by reducing inter-brand
competition. Moreover, a vertical structure often faces a number of decision variables, such
as selling eﬀorts, retailers’ inventory level and pre- sale service. If the upstream ﬁrm wants
to control more than one dimension of the downstream ﬁrms’ behavior, more complex re-
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industry, movie studios would like to simultaneously soften downstream retailers’ competi-
tion and encourage inventory holding. Two-part tariﬀs are unable to accomplish both. By
using revenue sharing, together with a low input price, movie studios can implement the ver-
tical integration outcome. Kolay, Shaﬀer and Ordover (2004) show that all-units discount
contracts can serve as a device for a monopolist manufacturer to extract greater surplus
from consumers, when the downstream retailer has private information about consumers’
demand, as well as eliminate the double marginalization problem.
xxx We should discuss this paper, and use it for current references: Milliou, C., E.
Petrakis 2007, ”Upstream Horizontal Mergers, Vertical Contracts and Bargaining,” Inter-
national Journal of Industrial Organization , 25, 963987.
Or perhaps the manufacturer’s problem is not asymmetric information or how to deter
entry, but how to make price discrimination successful when resale is possible at some cost.
That is what we will explore here.
2 The Model
A monopolist manufacturer supplies a homogeneous product to retailers in na identical
small towns and nb identical large cities. Consumers must buy in their own city or town,
but retailers can buy from other locations. Because there is only one retailer in each small
town, town retailers are monopolists with respect to selling to consumers. City retailers,
however, compete intensely using Bertrand pricing and earn zero proﬁts. If town or city
retailers sell to each other, they compete using Bertrand pricing (e.g., town retailers would
choose prices simultaneously to compete in selling to city retailers).
Denote wholesale prices by wa and wb, the franchise fees by Fa and Fb, retail prices by
pa and pb, and consumer demands by Da (pa) and Db (pb). We assume standard downward
sloping and concave demands, and that D000
a ≥ 0. We assume that demand is stronger
in cities than in towns– enough stronger that if arbitrage were impossible, the wholesale
prices would be higher in the cities, i.e. pm
b > e wa. This assumption will be used later in
Proposition 1.
Let the manufacturer have constant marginal cost c > 0 and let retailers have zero
distribution costs. If resale occurs between towns and cities, retailers incur a transportation
cost t > 0.
Because we assume consumer demand is concave, there exist unique retail monopoly
prices which we will denote pm
a and pm
b that maximize vertically integrated proﬁts.
The manufacturer can choose from two types of contracts– linear pricing or a two-part
tariﬀ. He will not choose to use both in the same market in equilibrium. Let Ia be an
indicator variable, where Ii = 1 if the manufacturer chooses a two-part tariﬀ contract for
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units as he wishes to buy. Under a two-part tariﬀ, the retailer pays the lump sum Fi > 0 if
he buys any units at all, plus wi per unit. Linear pricing has zero transactions cost, but the
two-part tariﬀ, being more complicated, incurs an extra transaction cost of g ≥ 0 (g = 0
is allowed, and is itself an interesting case). The manufacturer chooses the contracts ﬁrst,
and the retailers react by choosing the quantities to purchase, so in eﬀect the manufacturer
makes take–it-or-leave-it oﬀers to the retailers.
We will denote a retailer’s derived demand for the good as a function of the whole-
sale price by Dr
a(wa) or Dr




b(wb), are strictly decreasing and concave in wholesale prices wa
and wb.
Proof: In the Appendix.
3 The Equilibrium
We seek a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which the manufacturer chooses what pricing
scheme to use for cities and for towns and what prices and franchise fees to charge, and the
retailers react by choosing purchase amounts and wholesale and retail sales to maximize
their proﬁts.
First, consider what would happen if arbitrage could be blocked by contract– that is, if
a retailer could be deterred from reselling in a forbidden market by the threat of a suit for
breach of contract.
The manufacturer would choose a linear contract for cities and set the wholesale price
equal to the monopoly retail price: wm
b = pm
b . A city retailer would buy the quantity Da (pm
b )
and choose the retail price pm
b to maximize its proﬁts under Bertrand competition with other
city retailers. The manufacturer would do worse with a two-part tariﬀ, because the retailers,
knowing that they would compete their proﬁt margin to zero, would be unwilling to pay
Fb > 0 to buy a positive quantity.
The manufacturer would choose a two-part tariﬀ for towns, with a wholesale price equal
to marginal cost, so wa = c. A town retailer would buy the quantity Da (pm
a ) and choose
the retail price pm
a to maximize its proﬁts, and the franchise fee Fa would equal the gross
proﬁts.
If the manufacturer used linear pricing in towns, his proﬁts would fall because of double
marginalization. Denote his optimal linear price in this no-resale case by e wa, which would
be greater than c if he is to obtain positive proﬁts. As a result, when town retailers react





wa {(wa − c) · Da (p∗
a(wa))} (1)
and:
e pa ≡ p∗
a(e wa) (2)
where p∗
a(wa) is the reaction function of the town retailers and satisﬁes the ﬁrst order
condition of the town retailers’ proﬁt maximization.
Now let us assume that contracts cannot punish intermarket arbitrage. Since each
retailer sells both in towns and cities, if the wholesale price diﬀerence,
d ≡ (wb − wa),
is larger than the retailer transportation cost t, a retailer will arbitrage the product among
its stores across locations, or one retailer will arbitrage by buying from another.
Let us deﬁne two critical values of transportation costs:
t0 ≡ pm
b − e wa and t1 ≡ pm
b − c
.
Recall that in separate maximization problems pm
b is the monopoly wholesale price in
cities, and e wa and c are the wholesale prices for linear pricing and two-part tariﬀs in towns.
Thus, t0 is the optimal wholesale price diﬀerence between towns and cities if the retailers
do not arbitrage and the manufacturer chooses linear pricing for towns. Similarly, t1 is the
optimal wholesale price diﬀerence between towns and cities if the retailers do not arbitrage
and the manufacturer chooses a two-part tariﬀ for towns. The manufacturer’s proﬁt, π,
depends on what kind of arbitrage arises from its city-town pricing. The three possibilities
are: (i) the retailers do not arbitrage, (ii) the retailers arbitrage goods from towns to cities,
or (iii) the retailers arbitrage goods from cities to towns. Let us examine these possibilities
in turn.
Case (i) (No arbitrage): If the manufacturer chooses |(wb − wa)| ≤ t, then the retailers do
not arbitrage the goods. The manufacturer’s proﬁt is the sum of its proﬁts from all towns
and cities:
Maximum
wa,wb π||(wb−wa)|≤t = na · [(wa − c) · Dr
a(wa)
+ Ia · (Fa(wa) − g)]
+ nb · [(wb − c) · Dr
b(wcity)]
(3)
The ﬁrst square bracket in (3) is the manufacturer’s proﬁt from a town, and the second
square bracket is his proﬁt from a city. The ﬁrst round brackets in each square bracket are
the proﬁt margins. Ia is the indicator variable whether the manufacturer adopts two-part
tariﬀ contracts for towns, and its gain from a two-part tariﬀ contract from a town is the
franchise fee, Fa, net of the negotiation fee, g.
Case (ii) (Town retailers sell to city retailers): If the manufacturer chooses (wb − wa) > t,
city retailers will buy in towns. We have assumed that town retailers compete against each
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will be driven down to wa. To this the city retailers must add the transportation cost t
to get their marginal cost for selling to consumers, wa + t. Since the retailers compete in
Bertrand equilibrium in cities, the market price in cities is also wa+t, and correspondingly,
the eﬀective demand is Dr
b(wa + t). The manufacturer’s maximization problem becomes:
Max
wa,wb π|(wb−wa)>t = na · [(wa − c) · Dr
a(wa)
+ Ia · (Fa(wa) − g)]
+ nb · [(wa − c) · Dr
b(wa + t)]
(4)
Case (iii) (City retailers sell to town retailers): If the manufacturer chooses (wb−wa) < −t,
the retailers will arbitrage goods from cities to towns. The eﬀective wholesale price for
towns will be wb, to which t must be added to get the town retailers’ marginal cost, and
the manufacturer’s proﬁt function will be:
Max
wa,wb π|(wb−wa)<−t = na · [(wb − c) · Dr
a(wb + t)
+ Ia · (Fa(wb + t) − g)]
+ nb · [(wb − c) · Dr
b(wcity)]
(5)
Proposition 1 tells us that the manufacturer prefers Case (i), no arbitrage.
Proposition 1. In equilibrium, the manufacturer will prevent arbitrage. Wholesale prices
will be higher in the city, but by no more than the transportation cost: 0 < (wb − wa) ≤ t.
Proof: See the Appendix.
If the transportation cost is smaller than the wholesale price diﬀerence, the retailers
arbitrage. To prevent this happening, the manufacturer has to set a smaller wholesale price
diﬀerence. Alternatively, the manufacturer could allow arbitrage to occur. Proposition 1
says that the manufacturer’s best choice is to prevent arbitrage. This is because transporta-
tion is costly, creating a social loss that also hurts the manufacturer. The city retailers are
earning zero proﬁts anyway and their higher transportation costs from arbitrage result in
less demand from consumers and lower sales by the manufacturer. If the manufacturer could
impose vertical control over the actions of downstream retailers, it could prevent arbitrage
to realize the vertically integrated proﬁt. Since it cannot, it must reduce the extent of its
price discrimination.
If t is smaller than the critical values, t0 and t1, the transportation cost is “small” and
arbitrage starts to be attractive to retailers. To prevent arbitrage, the manufacturer must
choose (wb − wa) ≤ t. Under this constraint, the manufacturer’s proﬁt is increasing in
the wholesale price diﬀerence. Thus, for t smaller than the critical transportation costs
the manufacturer chooses (wb − wa) = t and the no-arbitrage constraint is binding. For t
larger than the critical values, the retailers do not arbitrage and therefore the manufacturer
chooses the unconstrained optimum.
74 The Equilibrium Contracts
To determine the manufacturer’s choice of contracts for towns, we will compare the manufac-
turer’s proﬁts under linear pricing, π∗ (I = 0,t), and under two-part tariﬀs, π∗ (I = 1,g,t).
Recall that g ≥ 0 is the transactions cost of the manufacturer if it adopts a two-part
tariﬀ. Let g(t), a function of transportation cost t, be the transactions cost such that
the manufacturer is indiﬀerent between choosing the two types of contracts for towns, i.e.
g (t) : π∗ (I = 1,g,t) ≡ π∗ (I = 0,t).
Proposition 2. (i) There exists a continuous function g (t) > 0 such that if the negotiation
cost is g > g (t) then in equilibrium linear pricing is used in towns but if g < g (t) a two-part
tariﬀ is used (and either might be used if g = g (t)).
(ii) Let the transportation cost t be smaller than the critical value t0 if the transaction
cost is g ≥ g(t) or t1 if g < g(t) (as in Figure 1’s Regions I and III). Under linear pricing
(Region I), the double marginalization problem is magniﬁed: the retail price for towns is
higher than under standard double marginalization. Even under a two-part tariﬀ (Region
III), the problem in towns cannot be totally eliminated, as the wholesale price for towns
will be above marginal cost and the retail price will be higher than the integrated monopoly
price.
Proof: See the Appendix.
One may interpret na · g (t) as the manufacturer’s beneﬁt from using two-part tariﬀ
contracts, because the manufacturer adopts a two-part tariﬀ if and only if the beneﬁt from
using the two-part tariﬀ is greater then the total cost na · g. We have not and will not
assume linear demands in our model, but for illustration we use linear demands in Figure 1
to generate the g (t) function (the upward sloping curve in the middle of the ﬁgure). Figure
1 shows the manufacturer’s choice of contracts and pricing decisions in equilibrium (with
na = 2, nb = 1, c = 2, Qa = 10 − pa, and Qb = 18 − pb).
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In Figure 1, the curve g (t) and the two critical values of the transportation costs parti-
tion the space into four pieces, Regions I to IV. Above g (t) the negotiation cost is “large”
and the manufacturer chooses linear contracts for towns (recall that by the manufacturer
always chooses linear contracts for cities). Below g (t) the negotiation cost is “small” and
the manufacturer chooses two-part tariﬀs for towns. Above g (t), the manufacturer uses lin-
ear pricing and thus t0 is the critical value of transportation cost. Below g (t), the critical
value is t1. To the left of the critical values the transportation costs are “small”. Thus in
Regions I and III the manufacturer chooses (wb−wa)∗ = t to prevent arbitrage. Conversely,
to the right of the critical values the transportation costs are “large”, and thus in Regions
II and IV the manufacturer chooses the unconstrained optimal wholesale prices.
The four regions in Figure 1 exist for non-linear concave demands as long as t0 and
t1 are strictly positive and ﬁnite and g (t) is continuous, positive and ﬁnite. The value
t0 ≡ pm
b − e wa is positive because pm
b > e wa and is ﬁnite because pm
b is bounded. Similarly,
t1 is strictly positive and ﬁnite. g (t) is generally continuous because w∗
a (t) and w∗
b (t) are
continuous at the critical values. The function is non-negative because the two-part tariﬀ
is more ﬂexible than linear pricing. For t larger than the critical values, retailers do not
arbitrage and the manufacturer’s beneﬁt from using a two-part tariﬀ is strictly positive.
Thus, g (t) is strictly positive at the critical values, and since g (t) is continuous at these
values, the four regions are not empty. Notice that t1 is always strictly larger than t0.
This is because under two-part tariﬀs the manufacturer lowers the wholesale price and thus
enlarges the wholesale price diﬀerence between towns and cities. For a greater range of
transportation costs the manufacturer has to choose (wb−wa)∗ = t to prevent the retailers’
arbitrage.
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transportation costs are “small”, and therefore in Regions I and III the manufacturer chooses
(wb−wa)∗ = t to prevent arbitrage. To achieve this target, the manufacturer can adjust the
wholesale price for only towns, only cities, or both. Proposition 2 says that the manufacturer
will adjust both. While decreasing the wholesale price for cities, the manufacturer increases
the wholesale price for towns. This not only achieves (wb−wa)∗ = t to prevent arbitrage, but
also magniﬁes the double marginalization problem for towns. Even with a two-part tariﬀ,
the wholesale price will be above marginal cost and the magniﬁed double marginalization
cannot be totally eliminated.
5 Welfare
If the two-part tariﬀ contracting cost g is low, two-part tariﬀs are used in towns regardless
of t. When t increases from a low level, the city price rises and the town price falls.
Manufacturer proﬁts from both sources rise, and both town and city retailer proﬁts do not
change. Town consumers have higher consumer surplus, and city consumers have lower
consumer surplus. After t rises to t1, however, arbitrage is no longer a constraint and
further increases have no eﬀect.
If the two-part tariﬀ contracting cost g is high enough, it always exceeds ¯ g(t). Linear
pricing is used, and if t is smaller than t0, the rising transportation cost increases prices in
the cities (the larger markets) and reduces them in the towns. The proﬁts of city retailers
do not change and the consumer surplus of city consumers fall in t, and those of town
retailers and consumers rise. After t rises to t0, arbitrage is no longer a binding constraint
and further increases have no eﬀect.
In Figure 2 we use the same demands used in Figure 1 (ﬁxing the two-part tariﬀ trans-
action cost at g = 3) to show the changes of social welfare with transportation costs for
a speciﬁc functional form. t(g) is the transportation cost, as a function of g, so that the
manufacturer is indiﬀerent between choosing the two types of contracts for towns.
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The manufacturer chooses linear pricing contracts if t ≤ t(g) and two-part tariﬀ con-
tracts otherwise. This is because if the constraint is binding by the Envelope theorem the
manufacturer’s proﬁt is increasing in t. Since the negotiation cost g is ﬁxed, if under uncon-
strained optimization the manufacturer’s beneﬁt from using a two-part tariﬀ is larger than
na · g, we can ﬁnd t(g) such that the manufacturer is indiﬀerent between the two types of
contracts. As t increases, the manufacturer switches from using linear pricing to a two-part
tariﬀ at t(g). Since in a two-part tariﬀ the manufacturer chooses lower wholesale prices for
both cities and towns, after the switch the retail prices decrease in both markets and social
welfare increases.
Thus, although it is hard to make general statements about welfare changes with t
because increasing the amount of price discrimination can in general make welfare either
rise or fall, we can make a more limited statement:
Proposition 3. (a) An increase in the retailer transportation cost t increases social welfare
in towns and reduces it in cities if t is small enough to have any eﬀect at all. (b) If t rises
to exceed t(g), prices fall in both towns and cities and consumer surpluses rise.
Proof. See the appendix.
If the retailer transportation cost is small, the manufacturer will set a small wholesale
price diﬀerence to prevent arbitrage. This increases the wholesale price for towns and
decreases the wholesale price for cities. An increase in transportation cost relaxes the
constraint of the manufacturer and thus increases his proﬁt, but it allows him to increase
11the disparity in prices, so in general we cannot say whether the increased welfare from town
demand exceeds the decreased welfare from city demand. As t increases, the manufacturer
switches to use a two-part tariﬀ at t(g). The wholesale prices for both towns and cities will
fall once a two-part tariﬀ is used in the towns, and the retail prices are strictly increasing
in the wholesale prices, so social welfare increases at t(g). Two-part tariﬀs do incur the
transaction cost g, however. If g is small, overall social welfare increases and there is a jump
at t(g).
How social welfare changes with the negotiation cost, g, is simpler. Consider a particular
value of the transportation cost, t. Given t, we can compute g (t). If g ≥ g (t), the
manufacturer chooses linear pricing contracts. In this situation, the negotiation cost g
does not go into the manufacturer’s proﬁt function, and thus is irrelevant to social welfare.
Conversely, if g < g (t), the manufacturer chooses a two-part tariﬀ. In this situation,
negotiation cost becomes part of the social cost, and social welfare falls linearly with g.
6 Conclusion
We have explored one reason why a two-part tariﬀ might not be suﬃcient to solve the
problem of double marginalization in a retail network: the danger of resale while attempting
price discrimination. This insuﬃciency could help explain why vertical ﬁrms sometimes use
more complicated and hard-to-administer contracts than the simple two-part tariﬀ.
If retailers sell to markets with diﬀerent market powers, wholesale price diﬀerence be-
tween markets may cause retailer arbitrage. If a monopolist manufacturer can impose a
vertical control over the actions of the downstream retailers, it can prevent arbitrage directly,
but otherwise it must do so by setting the wholesale price diﬀerence to be smaller than the
transportation cost between retailers. Taking as given this strategy of the manufacturer, we
examined the classical double marginalization problem. If the transportation cost is small,
the manufacturer will raise the wholesale price for towns and reduce the wholesale price
for cities. If the manufacturer adopts linear pricing, this distortion of optimal wholesale
pricing magniﬁes the double marginalization problem in towns. Even with a two-part tariﬀ,
the wholesale price will be higher than the marginal cost, and the double marginalization
problem cannot be totally eliminated.
There are occasions where a two-part tariﬀ fails to be a suﬃcient vertical restraint; for
example, when the retailers have private information or the retailers are risk averse and
there is uncertainty about demands. In this paper, we did not assume private information
or uncertain demands. Neither did we assume inter-brand competition or retailer services
that introduce horizontal externalities. Even so, in a retail network, if transportation cost
is small, a two-part tariﬀ cannot achieve the proﬁts of vertical integration. Manufacturers
usually sell to multiple markets through retailers, and retailers usually have diﬀerent market
power in diﬀerent locations. Since the two-part tariﬀ is not a suﬃcient instrument in a retail
network, we may observe ﬁrms using more sophisticated combinations of vertical restraints
instead, or, if two-part tariﬀs are adminstratively costly, going to the other extreme of giving
12up on two-part tariﬀs and using linear prices.
Preventing resale directly may be prohibitively costly, but one contractual feature that
would be helpful, if legal, would be a prohibition on retailers selling the manufacturer’s good
without having paid the franchise fee. This would eliminate the possibility of city-to-town
arbitrage, because the manufacturer could shut down a town retailer who was selling the
good to consumers (having bought it from the city) without having paid the franchise fee.
As a result, the manufacturer could raise the town franchise fee higher than in our model’s
equilibrium, setting it to equal the town retailer’s entire gross proﬁt. The manufacturer
would also set a city franchise fee, but it would equal zero. Since the town two-part tariﬀ
would be more proﬁtable, the manufacturer would choose it for values of the transaction
cost g higher than in our model. The problem described in this paper would by no means
disappear, however, because the more serious form of arbitrage is from towns to cities.
Although town retailers would pay the franchise fee and end up with zero proﬁt, it would
not follow that their wholesale price could equal marginal cost, because then city retailers
(having paid their franchise fees of zero) would buy from town retailers instead of directly
from the manufacturer.
Welfare of the manufacturer, the retailers, and the consumers change in diﬀerent ways
depending on the diﬃculty of arbitrage. In our model, a monopolist sells to competing
retailers in cities and monopolistic ones in each small town. With high transportation
costs, he uses two-part tariﬀs in the towns (provided that the transactions cost g in our
model is low enough) and linear pricing in the cities. If transportation costs are lower, the
manufacturer can still use a two-part tariﬀ in the towns, but he cannot make the unit price
equal to marginal cost or city retailers will shift their demand to the towns. We have shown
that the manufacturer will set the unit price in the town two-part tariﬀ high enough that city
retailers will not buy from the towns. He will also reduce the city price below the monopoly
level, as a second way to reduce the temptation to arbitrage. Higher transportation costs
could therefore increase welfare by causing manufacturers to shift to lower prices in the
towns. Higher transportation costs can help because they cause the manufacturer to shift
from linear pricing to the more eﬃcient two-part tariﬀ, and in fact prices can fall in both
towns and cities as a result. The welfare eﬀect of higher transportation costs in general
is ambiguous, however, because higher welfare in the towns, where prices fall, must be
balanced against lower welfare in the cities, where they fall.
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Lemma 1. The retailers’ derived demands for the good, Dr
a(wa) and Dr
b(wb), are strictly
decreasing and concave in wholesale prices wa and wb.
Proof: I First, we show that Dr
b(wb) is strictly decreasing and concave in wb. Diﬀerentiating
the derived demand function Dr
b(wb) ≡ Db(p∗

























. Since in cities the retailers
compete in prices, p∗
b(wb) = wb, and therefore
dp∗
b(wb)















Second, diﬀerentiating two times Dr
a(wa) ≡ Da(p∗























a . Then we diﬀerentiate the













dwa < 0. Diﬀerentiating the retailer’s ﬁrst order condition again with
































Proposition 1. In equilibrium, the manufacturer will prevent arbitrage. Wholesale prices
will be higher in the city, but by no more than the transportation cost: 0 < (wb − wa) ≤ t.
Proof: To show that there is no arbitrage we need to show that the manufacturer’s max-
imum proﬁt in (3) is strictly greater than in (4) or (5). Let w0
a solve the maximization
problem in (4). Choose wa = w0
a and wb = w0
a in (3) and compare the resulting proﬁt func-
tions in (3) and (4). By Lemma 1, Dr
b(wb) is strictly decreasing in wb, so the manufacturer’s
maximum proﬁt in (3) is strictly greater than in (4), regardless of the choice of Ia.
Let w0
b solve the maximization problem in (5). Choose wa = w0
b and wb = w0
b in ( 3) and
compare the resulting proﬁt functions in (3) and (5). Since Dr
a(wa) is strictly decreasing in
wa by Lemma 1 and Fa(wa) is decreasing in wa, the manufacturer’s maximum proﬁt in (3)
is strictly greater than in (5), regardless of the choice of Ia.
Thus, if arbitrage occurred in any equilibrium, the manufacturer would decrease the
absolute value of the wholesale price diﬀerence until it did not, which rules out equilibria
with a wholesale price diﬀerence of |(wb − wa)| > t with arbitrage occuring.
Next let us show that (wb − wa) > 0. First remove the constraint |(wb − wa)| ≤ t
from maximization problem (3) and let (w0
a,w0
b) be the solution. Without the constraint
|(wb − wa)| ≤ t, the manufacturer’s problem is separable into maximization problems
for towns and for cities. If the manufacturer chooses linear pricing, it chooses wholesale
prices e wa for towns and pm
b for cities. Since we have pm
b > e wa, the unconstrained opti-
14mal (wb − wa)
0 = pm
b − e wa is positive. If the manufacturer chooses a two- part tariﬀ, the
wholesale price is even lower for towns and the sign of (wb − wa)
0 does not change.
Now, put back the constraint |wb−wa| ≤ t into maximization problem (3). If (wb − wa)
0




∗ > 0, though possibly that diﬀerence is strictly less than t.
If (wb − wa)
0 does not satisfy |(wb − wa)| ≤ t, positive (wb − wa)
0 implies (wb − wa)
0 >
t. Since the manufacturer’s proﬁt in (3) is twice diﬀerentiable and ∂2π
∂(wb−wa)2 = nb ·
[2Dr0
b + (wb − c) · Dr00
b ] < 0, the proﬁt function is concave in (wb − wa). Because of the
concavity, (wb − wa)
0 > t implies π is increasing over −t ≤ (wb − wa) ≤ t and the manu-
facturer will choose (wb − wa)∗ = t. Thus, the price diﬀerence is positive and might be as
great as t. 
Proposition 2. (i) There exists a continuous function g (t) > 0 such that if the negotiation
cost is g > g (t) then in equilibrium linear pricing is used in towns but if g < g (t) a two-part
tariﬀ is used (and either might be used if g = g (t)).
(ii) Let the transportation cost t be smaller than the critical value t0 if the transaction
cost is g ≥ g(t) or t1 if g < g(t) (as in Figure 1’s Regions I and III). Under linear pricing
(Region I), the double marginalization problem is magniﬁed: the retail price for towns is
higher than under standard double marginalization. Even under a two-part tariﬀ (Region
III), the problem in towns cannot be totally eliminated, as the wholesale price for towns
will be above marginal cost and the retail price will be higher than the integrated monopoly
price.
Proof:
(i) The manufacturer’s piecewise maximization problem in (3) to (5 ) can be reduced to the
following, with Proposition 1 justifying the constraint:
Max
wa,wb π = na · [(wa − c) · Dr
a(wa) + Ia · (Fa(wa) − g)]
+ nb · [(wb − c) · Dr
b(wb)] such that 0 < (wb − wa) ≤ t
(6)
The Lagrangian function is:
L = na · [(wa − c) · Dr
a(wa) + Ia · (Fa(wa) − g)]
+ nb · [(wb − c) · Dr
b(wb)] + λ · [t − (wb − wa)]
(7)
We may regard the wholesale price diﬀerence, (wb − wa), as a choice variable of the
manufacturer. Instead of choosing both wholesale prices, the manufacturer chooses the
wholesale price for towns, wa, and the wholesale price diﬀerence, (wb − wa). Since the
wholesale price diﬀerence (wb − wa) > 0 (Proposition 1) and wa ≥ c > 0, the Kuhn-Tucker
15conditions are:
∂L
∂wa = na · [Dr
a(w∗
a) + (w∗
a − c) · Dr0
a (w∗
a)
+ Ia · F0
a(w∗
a)]
+ nb · [Dr
b(w∗
b) + (w∗





∂ (wb − wa)
= nb · [Dr
b(w∗
b) + (w∗
b − c) · Dr0
b (w∗




a) (with t = (w∗
b − w∗
a) if λ∗ > 0) (10)
Notice that variables Ia for whether a two-part tariﬀ is used and λ for whether the
arbitrage constraint is binding each have values either positive or zero. There are in total
four diﬀerent combinations of Ia and λ. Let us relate the four combinations of policies in
Figure 1 to the two critical values of transportation costs, t0 and t1. We will need to show
three things about this:
(a) If the manufacturer chooses linear pricing for towns, then λ∗ > 0 and the arbitrage
constraint is binding if and only if t < t0.
(b) If the manufacturer chooses a two-part tariﬀ for towns, then λ∗ > 0 and the arbitrage
constraint is binding if and only if t < t1.
(c) The manufacturer’s optimal choices of wholesale prices, w∗
a(t) and w∗
b(t), are continuous
at the two critical values of transportation costs.
(a) Consider linear pricing contracts ( Ia = 0). If λ∗ = 0, the arbitrage constraint is not
binding and the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (8) and (9) give the same ﬁrst order conditions
as unconstrained maximization. Thus, the manufacturer chooses e wa for towns and pm
b for
cities. This implies (wb − wa)
∗ = pm
b − e wa and according to the deﬁnition of t0 we obtain
(wb − wa)
∗ = t0. On the other hand, since λ∗ = 0, (10) implies t ≥ (wb − wa)
∗. Combining






b)] > 0. The left hand side of this inequality is ∂π
∂(wb−wa). Since π
is concave in (wb−wa), the inequality ∂π
∂(wb−wa) > 0 implies (wb−wa)∗ < pm
b − e wa ≡ t0 . On
the other hand, since λ∗ > 0, (10) implies that the constraint is binding and (wb−wa)∗ = t.
Combining the two conditions we obtain that t < t0.
(b) The proof is parallel to that for (a), with t1 being the critical value instead.
(c) By parts (a) and (b), for t greater than the critical values, λ∗ = 0 and the constraint
is not necessarily binding. If Ia = 0, wholesale prices e wa and pm
b solve the Kuhn-Tucker
conditions (8) and (9), and if Ia = 1, then marginal cost c and pm
b solve both (8) and (9).
For t smaller than the critical values, λ∗ > 0 and by (10) (wb − wa)∗ = t. Kuhn-Tucker




a − c) · Dr0
a (w∗
a)
+ Ia · F0
a(w∗
a)]
+ nb · [Dr
b(w∗
a + t) + (w∗
a + t − c) · Dr0
b (w∗





a + t) + (w∗
a + t − c) · Dr0
b (w∗
a + t)] − λ∗ = 0 (90)
As the transportation cost t approaches the critical values, λ∗ → 0. We can substitute
t = t0 ≡ pm
b − e wa into (80) and (90) and ﬁnd that e wa and pm
b solve these equations when
Ia = 0. Similarly, substitute t = t1 ≡ pm
b − c into ( 80) and (90) to ﬁnd that c and pm
b
solve these equations when Ia = 1. Thus, the manufacturer’s optimal wholesale prices are
continuous at the critical values of transportation costs.
The manufacturer’s proﬁt π∗ (I = 1,g = 0,t) cannot be strictly less than π∗ (I = 0,t).
Moreover, π∗ (I = 1,g,t) is strictly decreasing in g, and therefore we can always ﬁnd g (t) ≥ 0
satisfying the identity. In other words, g (t) exists for all t > 0. Equating the manufacturer’s
optimal proﬁts in (6) for I = 0 and I = 1, we can solve explicitly g (t) in terms of w∗ (I = 0,t)
and w∗ (I = 1,t). By result (c) above, w∗
a (t) and w∗
b (t) are continuous at the critical values
for both I = 0 and I = 1. Thus, g (t) is also continuous at the critical values and is in
general continuous for t > 0.
(ii) In (a), (b) and (c) we have established that if transportation costs are less than the
critical values (Figure 1’s Regions I and III), the Lagrange multiplier is positive: λ∗ > 0.





b)] > 0. The
terms in the square bracket of this inequality is the ﬁrst derivative of the manufacturer’s





∂wb > 0 implies w∗
b < pm
b . Substituting nb · [Dr
b(w∗
b) + (w∗
b − c) · Dr0
b (w∗








a)] < 0. The terms in the square bracket
of this last inequality is the ﬁrst derivative of the manufacturer’s proﬁt from a town, πa,
with respect to wa. If Ia = 0 (in Region I), πa is concave in wa and e wa solves ∂πa
∂wa = 0.
Thus, ∂πa
∂wa < 0 implies that w∗
a > e wa. Since with linear pricing the retail price is increasing
in wholesale price, w∗
a > e wa implies p∗
a > e pa. If Ia = 1 (as in Region III), then wa = c solves
∂πa
∂wa = 0 and the stationary point locally maximizes the manufacturers proﬁt. Then ∂πa
∂wa
< 0 implies w∗
a > c and p∗
a > pm
a . 
Proposition 3. (a) An increase in the retailer transportation cost t increases social welfare
in towns and reduces it in cities if t is small enough to have any eﬀect at all. (b) If t rises
to exceed t(g), prices fall in both towns and cities and consumer surpluses rise.
(a) Denote social welfare in towns and cities as SWa and SWb. The social welfare for towns
is
SW∗




[pa (Q) − c]dQ (11)
where pa (Q) is the inverse demand function and D∗
a (g,t) ≡ Da (p∗
a (w∗
a (g,t))). Using
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+[pa (D∗











∂t [pa (Q) − c] = 0, ∂0
∂t = 0, pa (D∗
a (g,t)) = p∗
a and D∗
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The eﬀect of the retailer transportation cost on social welfare in towns is positive because
(p∗
a − c) > 0, Dr0
a < 0 and
∂w∗
a(g,t)




= nb · (p∗










∂t < 0 and
∂w∗
b(g,t)
∂t > 0 we diﬀerentiate the Kuhn-Tucker conditions





















































and the value of I∗
a is 1 if and only if g < g (t) and is 0 otherwise; and that if the constraint







(b) As the transportation cost t increases to t(g), the manufacturer switches to use a
two-part tariﬀ. We want to show that the wholesale prices in both towns and cities are
lower when Ia = 1 than when Ia = 0. There are three separate cases depending on the size
of t.
(Case i) t ≥ t1. The constraint is not binding. λ∗ = 0 and pm
b and e wa solve the Kuhn-Tucker
conditions in (8) and (9) when Ia = 0 and pm
b and c solve the Kuhn-Tucker conditions when
I1 = 1. Thus, the wholesale prices are higher when Ia = 0 than when Ia = 1.
(Case ii) t < t0. The constraint is binding. λ∗ > 0 and (9) implies
∂πb
∂wb (w∗












∂wb is the slope of the manufacturer’s proﬁt function for cities and ∂πa
∂wa is the slope for
towns. We let w∗
a (Ia = 0) and w∗
b (Ia = 0) solve the Kuhn-Tucker conditions when Ia = 0,
and let w∗
a (Ia = 1) and w∗
b (Ia = 1) solve the conditions when Ia = 1. If Ia = 0 it follows
that ∂πa
∂wa (w∗
a (Ia = 0)) = na · [Dr
a(w∗
a (Ia = 0)) + (w∗
a (Ia = 0) − c) · Dr0
a (w∗
a (Ia = 0))]. If
Ia = 1, ∂πa
∂wa (w∗
a (Ia = 1)) = na · [Dr
a(w∗
a (Ia = 1))+ (w∗
a (Ia = 1) − c) · Dr0
a (w∗
a (Ia = 1))] +
18na · 1 · F0
a(w∗
a (Ia = 1)) and thus ∂πa
∂wa|Ia=1 (w∗
a (Ia = 1)) = ∂πa
∂wa|Ia=0 (w∗
a (Ia = 1)) + na ·
F0
a(w∗
a (Ia = 1)) . Since na · F0
a(w∗








a (Ia = 1)) (18)








a (Ia = 0)) (19)
and if Ia = 1, (17) implies
∂πb
∂wb (w∗
b (Ia = 1)) = − ∂πa
∂wa|Ia=1 (w∗








a (Ia = 1)) (20)
Since λ∗ > 0, (10) implies w∗
b−w∗
a = t regardless of Ia = 1 or Ia = 0. Thus, w∗
b (Ia = 1)−
w∗
a (Ia = 1) = t and w∗
b (Ia = 0)−w∗
a (Ia = 0) = t. Combining the two conditions we obtain
w∗
b (Ia = 1) − w∗
b (Ia = 0) = w∗
a (Ia = 1) − w∗
a (Ia = 0) (21)
There are two possible subcases for the wholesale price in cities — w∗
b (Ia = 1) ≥
w∗
b (Ia = 0) and w∗
b (Ia = 1) < w∗
b (Ia = 0). To show that in fact the latter is correct,
suppose that the opposite is true and thus w∗
b (Ia = 1) ≥ w∗
b (Ia = 0). Since the constraint
is binding, by Proposition 1 w∗
a > e wa and w∗
b < pm
b . Since πb is strictly concave and
∂πb
∂wb (w∗
b) > 0, w∗
b (Ia = 1) ≥ w∗








b (Ia = 1)) (22)








a (Ia = 0)) (23)
Since πa|Ia=0 is also strictly concave and ∂πa
∂wa (w∗
a) < 0, ( 20) implies w∗
a (Ia = 1) <
w∗
a (Ia = 0). This implies that the right hand side of ( 21) is strictly negative. However, we
have assumed that w∗
b (Ia = 1) ≥ w∗
b (Ia = 0), which implies the left hand side of (21) is non-
negative. This is a contradiction and we can thus conclude that w∗
b (Ia = 0) > w∗
b (Ia = 1).
Since w∗
b (Ia = 1) = w∗
a (Ia = 1) + t and w∗
b (Ia = 0) = w∗
a (Ia = 0) + t, we obtain also
w∗
a (Ia = 0) > w∗
a (Ia = 1).
(Case iii) t0 ≤ t < t1. The constraint is binding for Ia = 1 but not for Ia = 0. If Ia = 0,
the manufacturer chooses wholesale prices e wa for towns and pm
b for cities. On the other
hand, if Ia = 1, by Proposition 1 w∗
b < pm
b and therefore w∗
b (Ia = 0) > w∗
b (Ia = 1). From
the proof in part (ii) we know that w∗
a (Ia = 1) < w∗
a (Ia = 0) for all t < t0. By Lemma
194 the manufacturer’s optimal wholesale prices are continuous at the critical values of the
transportation cost and therefore w∗
a (Ia = 1) < w∗
a (Ia = 0) at t = t0. From the proof
in part (a) we know that
∂w∗
a(g,t)
∂t < 0 if the constraint is binding and
∂w∗
a(g,t)
∂t = 0 if the
constraint is not binding. These conditions together imply w∗
a (Ia = 1) < w∗
a (Ia = 0) for
t0 ≤ t < t1.
We have shown that the wholesale prices are lower when Ia = 1 than when Ia = 0.
Retail prices are strictly increasing in the wholesale pricesm, so all prices will fall if t rises
enough to induce a switch to two-part tariﬀs in the towns. 
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THINGS TO DO
1. Read Milliou, C., and E. Petrakis 2007, ”Upstream Horizontal Mergers, Vertical
Contracts and Bargaining,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 25, pp.
963-987. and add more current references. Take, for instance, the recent contributions
ofMarx/Shaﬀer (in Rand) as well as of Rey/Thal/Verge on ”three-part-tariﬀs”. What
about the price discrimination on inputs literature, the referee asks.
2. Discuss what happens if other pricing schemes besides linear pricing or a two part
tariﬀ could be used. Quantity requirements and retail price ceiling.
3. Discuss stylized facts. Where does this model apply?
Maybe we could send this to the The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy.
They ahve quick turnaround and publication at several levels, which would be useful for
you.
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